ABSTRACT In online social networks (OSNs), high trust value entities play an important role in service recommendation when users inquire certain service. Generally, users in OSNs are more willing to choose those services recommended by high trust value entities. In fact, users may suffer from great loss of property once they accept some bad services provided by high trust value entities. However, current schemes do not consider this problem. Hence, we propose a scheme called RHT (recommendation from high trust value entities) to evaluate the trust degree of service recommended by high trust value entities. To be specific, there exist other users who provide their ratings to the service recommended by a high trust value entity, and RHT first selects the trusted ones from those users by computing the similarity between target user and them. Simultaneously, RHT also withstands malicious attacks during the trusted nodes selection. In addition, we also design an adaptive trust computation method to calculate trust value according to the ratings of trusted users. The experimental results show that RHT has higher accuracy in trust evaluation compared with current representative schemes and do effectively resistant four common attacks when choosing trusted nodes INDEX TERMS High trust value entities, online social networks, recommendation, trust computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of online social networks (OSNs) has attracted more and more attention because they provide a convenient platform for users to exchange events, activities and interests with their friends, colleagues and relatives. According to statistics, 1 ''The amount of users on Facebook has attained 2 billion in 2017, which increases 25% compared with that in 2015.'' Due to the huge amount of users in OSNs, a lot of large-scale service providers (SPs) such as Tencent, Apple Inc., establish products or service advertisements through online social sites such as Facebook, Twitter, etc. In addition, users are also able to browse these advertisements, share their ratings or opinions about services they experienced through famous social platforms. such ratings and opinions aggregated in OSNs provides a reference for target users' choices on services to some extents.
Trust value, an efficient metric means in trust management mechanism [1] , [2] , is widely applied in OSNs to facilitate users' decisions making promptly when it is arduous and 1 https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/ essential for users to select their preferred services from large quantities of recommendation. It generally reflects the trust degree of users' recommendation on services. Commonly, users can choose services recommended by high trust value entities. In other words, the services provided by high trust value entities are more reliable and trusted than those of the lowers in theory.
However, high trust value entities may provide bad services to target users for the acquisition of extra profit although they previously recommended satisfied services. These low-quality services afforded by high trust value entities do exert negative effect on target users and lead to the great loss of assets, even lives in practice. For example, a few patients may die after receiving experimental treatment at certain famous hospital, which he learned from a promoted result on some well-known recommendation web sites, 2 these web sites are often referred to as entities with high trust value. Hence, how to explicitly evaluate the trust degree of services recommended by high trust value entities is becoming more and more essential.
However, current schemes [3] - [7] can't efficiently solve this problem although they make great promotion in recommendation performance. Two main reasons can be elaborated as follows. Firstly, some of schemes are based on the trust value, that means these schemes utilize trust value as a major metric method to estimate the trust degree of services recommended by other entities. According to the idea of these schemes, the higher trust value a recommender owns, the more target users are willing to choose the service provided by him. Consequently, these schemes have simply to be left when high trust value recommenders provide false services to target users. In fact, trust value is not a unique benchmark to judge whether a service should be adopted or not. Besides, target users also take other factors into account when making decision on services. For example, if two users, Alice and Bob (Bob is a target user), are friends or have common interests like swimming, the service recommended by Alice may be more reliable than a third user, say Lily with high trust value.
Secondly, other schemes [5] , [8] - [13] which aim to solve attacks to enhance recommendation performance also neglect the scenario that high trust value entities recommend bad services to target users. In OSNs, there mainly exists four kinds of attacks [14] : Bad-Mouthing Attacks (BMA), BallotStuffing Attacks (BSA), White-Washing Attacks (WWA) and On-Off Attacks (OOA), where BMA and BSA provide malicious negative ratings or malicious positive ratings to a target user when he asks for certain service, WWA can promote their trust value by illegal ways such as providing good ratings for themselves or revoking low ratings, OOA affords malicious and normal ratings alternatively to a service provided by a well-behaved entity (user or SP). The existence of these malicious attacks may interfere with users' decision on service or item when target users require it. Reference [8] only consider BMA and BSA regardless of other three attacks. References [9] - [12] only solve BMA and BSA but neglect WWA and OOA. References [13] and [5] only tackle OOA without considering other three attacks.
Based on the statements above, we know that current shcemes neither consider this scenario nor tackle it efficiently. In reality, users' choices on services are more prone to be influenced by recommendation from high trust value entities. Hence it is necessary to estimate the recommendation from high trust value entities. To this end, we propose a novel scheme to accurately evaluate the trust degree of service provided by a high trust value entities. In OSNs, there exist users who share their ratings or opinions to a service recommended by a high trust value entity (i.e., user or SP). For a service recommended by a high trust value entity, RHT first selects trusted raters for a target user via calculating the similarities between raters and him, here we determine the value of similarities from three aspects, that is common-friend, commoninterest, common-BC. Besides that, the proposed scheme also resists the five prime attacks during trusted nodes selection by calculating the error of ratings afforded by different users. After determining the trusted nodes, we design a method based on optimization to compute the final trust value for target node via adaptively adjusting the weight parameter. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a novel trust-based scheme applied in recommendation to evaluate the trust degree of service provided by high trust value entities. Current schemes don't consider this issue which is crucial to the performance of recommendation. 2) We design an attack resistance mechanism to withstand attacks during recommendation. The advantage of our mechanism can cope with four attacks (i.e., BMA, BSA, WWA, OOA) compared with current schemes which can only tackle a part of them. 3) We design an adaptive calculation method to compute trust value. Our method can dynamically adjust the parameters applied in the process of combination. Finally, We evaluate RHT via two real data sets, Epinions and Ciao. The smaller value on RMSE and higher value on precision, recall and F-score show that our scheme outperform current state-of-the-art approaches and it can efficiently withstand four attacks during recommendation. The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the related work. Section 3 states some preliminaries used in this paper. Section 4 indicates the overview and presents the details of our scheme. Section 5 describes the experimental results and complexity analysis. Section 6 concludes this paper and suggests future work.
II. RELATED WORK A. TRUST EVALUATION
In this paper, our scheme aims to accurately evaluate the trust degree of services recommended by high trust value entities (e.g., users or SPs). According to [1] , trust evaluation models can be divided into three aspects, i.e., graph-based trust models, interaction-based trust models and hybrid trust models.
1) GRAPH-BASED TRUST MODELS
Graph-based trust models [15] - [17] incorporate trust with graph theory to enhance the precision of trust evaluation. Generally, they utilize a graph structure to represent trust relationship between users. In a graph, vertices indicate users, an edge between any two vertices indicates trust relationship. The value on this edge reflects the strength of relationship between two nodes. Our scheme also applies graph-based method to model the trust relationship among users.
2) INTERACTION-BASED TRUST MODELS
Interaction-based trust models apply interactions existing in the networks to compute social trust between users. Yan et al. [18] propose a trust model based on users' behaviors, which assists the evaluation and management of the mobile application's VOLUME 6, 2018 trust with user friendliness. Nepal et al. [19] propose STrust, a social trust model based simply on interactions with the social networks. This method combines two types of trust to determine the social trust in the community, i.e., popularity trust and engagement trust. The former represents the number of acceptance and agreement of a member in the community, the latter represents the trust of a member towards the community. Koren [20] also proposes a trust propagation model based on interactions, which combines the behavior of both individual and their friends. This method considers three factors: the density of interaction between users, the degree of separation and the decay of friendship effect. These factors can promote the effect of personalized recommendation.
3) HYBRID TRUST MODELS
Hybrid trust models mainly integrate both graph-based with interaction-based trust model. Currently, the majority of trust models are hybrid. Trifunovic et al. [21] propose a trust model applied in opportunistic networks which allow users to participate in varieties of interactions with applications such as micro-blogs. By leveraging the structure of social network and its dynamics, authors propose two reciprocal approaches for social establishment: explicit social trust and implicit social trust. This model is validated to efficiently resist Sybil and manipulation attacks. Wang et al. [22] propose a fine-grained feature-based social influence evaluation model. In this paper, Wang et al. [22] first construct users' initial influence by exploring two necessary factors (i.e., the impact and the importance) and then calculate social influence via page rank-based algorithm. Wu et al. [23] propose a hybrid trust-based evaluation method and a visual consensus aggregation model for multiple criteria group decision making with insufficient linguistic information.
B. RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS
In recent years, various types of recommender systems (RSs) techniques have been developed and extensively deployed to provide users with high-quality accurate recommendation from majority of choices [24] . Typically, the task of RSs is to offer users with a series of items they may prefer, or predict the preferences of users for certain item [25] . Actually, two widely deployed methods of RSs are content-based RSs, collaborate filtering RSs, respectively [25] .
1) CONTENT-BASED RSS
Content-based RSs aim to recommend users with items which are similar to the ones that they preferred in the past. The main idea of content-based RSs is to recommend new interesting items to users by combining the attributes of users profile with past items. Aggarwal [26] introduces two types of content-based RSs: One is, IMDb, 3 a movie recommendation site which provides personalized recommendation to users according to movie information such as director, actors, genre, etc. The other is Pandora Internet radio, 4 a famous music recommendation engine, which associates users' feedback with the features of songs to give appropriate recommendation for users.
Besides, other methods applied in the content-based RSs have been proposed. Diederich and Iofciu [27] and De Gemmis et al. [28] utilize text information to make classification for users and apply tags as a tool to filter or modify the rating scores to make system better. Gu et al. [29] propose a unified method to simultaneously learn the weights of multiple content matching signals and global terms for some special recommendation tasks. Method in [29] can deal with large-scale data sets efficiently.
2) COLLABORATE FILTERING RSs
Apart from content-based RSs, collaborate filtering-based RSs (CFRSs) [24] , [11] , are another prevalent RSs. According to [25] , CF approaches are classified into two categories, i.e., Matrix Factorization (MF)-based and Neighborhood-based (NHB).
a: MATRIX FACTORIZATION (MF)-BASED
The main idea of MF is to provide accurate recommendation for users by using relationship, preferences and known user-item ratings to model. This approach can be trained by available data and predict some ratings on new items. Zhang et al. [30] propose a health-care RS based on hybrid MF, iDoctor which provides personalized and professionalized guidelines for patients to select medical services. Guo et al. [24] propose TrustSVD model which is based on SVD++ [20] . TrustSVD simultaneously considers both the explicit and implicit influence of ratings and trust information when predicting ratings of unknown items.
b: NEIGHBORHOOD(NH)-BASED
NH approach is to use ratings stored in the system to directly predict ratings for new items [25] . This can be done by user-based or item-based approaches. User-based approaches estimate user's preference on an item by using others' ratings on this item. Hasan et al. [32] propose three types of similar users by combining traditional similarity metrics, i.e., super similar users, super dissimilar users and average similar users. These three types of similar users improve the precision of user-based methods. Bellogín et al. [33] propose a framework based on performance prediction method and query performance methodology in the information retrieval area for neighbor selection and weighting in user-based CF systems. Item-based approaches generally predict a user's rating for an item according to this user's rating on other similar items. Li et al. [31] propose an optimized MapReduce for item-based CF algorithm combined with empirical analysis to solve the efficiency problem under the large quantity of data.
In summary, current RSs schemes do raise the accuracy, efficiency and performance of recommendation and attain much better user experience. However, several problems are still waiting for solving: 1). Content-based RSs neither consider social relationship between users nor some invalid or malicious ratings such as bad-mouthing, ballotstuffing and white washing in the real world. This means these methods may not get the exquisite recommendations in OSNs. 2). Although CF approaches attain higher recommendation accuracy and consider the relationship between users in OSNS, they don't examine the reliability of ratings. That is, they assume that all the ratings are trusted, which is conflict with the practice because there are some anomalous ratings which interfere with recommendation in practice. Thus, these CF methods can't resist the anomalous behaviors to realize better recommendation, either. More importantly, all of these schemes don't consider the negative impact of anomalous behaviors from high trust value entities to the performance of recommendation.
The proposed scheme can accurately evaluate the trust degree of services provided by high trust value entities other than ensuring the efficiency of recommendation when confronted with other attacks such as bad-mouthing attacks (BMA), ballot-stuffing attacks (BSA) and white-washing attacks (WWA), and on-off attacks (OOA).
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we mainly define the problem we address and introduce other basic concepts used in this paper. Some essential notations are described in TABLE 1. 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We consider a scenario of recommendation from high trust value nodes (RHT). As shown in Fig.1 , a high trust value node µ v provides a service (or an item), denoted by S, which is interesting for a target node µ r . Given the fact that a high trust value node may provide low quality services, our problem is to evaluate the trust degree of S provided by µ v for µ r .
In OSNs, there exist some nodes who have experienced S. Note that these nodes rate S to express their satisfaction. Such ratings furnish direct reference for µ r to make a general acquaintance of S in theory. But in fact, there exist some malicious ratings provided by attackers (e.g., bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, etc.) which may affect µ r 's decision. Hence, we must select efficient ratings provided by trusted nodes from those who have experienced S and offer trust value on S for µ r when he makes decision.
B. DIRECT/INDIRECT NODES IN OSNS
Given an undirected social network G = {U, ξ }, where U = {µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . µ m } is the set of nodes, ξ = {U × U} is the set of edges representing direct interaction or transaction between adjacent nodes. For a high trust value node µ v , we define two types of interaction pattern nodes as follows: direct nodes and indirect nodes shown in Fig.2 . • Direct nodes: In an undirected social networks G = {U, ξ }, if (µ v , µ i ) ∈ ξ , i.e., there is an edge between µ v and other nodes µ i , µ i is µ v 's direct nodes. In other words, µ i has experienced the service S recommended by µ v .
• Indirect nodes: In an undirected social networks
, there is no edge between µ v and other nodes µ i , but µ i can reach µ v VOLUME 6, 2018 through direct nodes, µ i is an indirect node for µ v . In other words, µ i doesn't experience the service S, but he can acknowledge S via other nodes who have experienced S.
C. BEHAVIOR CONTENTS
Behavior contents (BC) reflect the contents of a node's service he previously experienced or recommended. For example, a node µ i provides some recommendations about shopping or purchases a service of movie VIP (i.e., Very Important Person). Shopping and movie VIP in this example are named as behavior contents.
Actually, each node has his own behavior contents list which is open to other nodes. According to our observation in the real world, a node µ i is more willing to trust the ratings from another node µ j who has similar contents with µ i 's in the past. In other words, if two nodes own more similar BC reciprocally, the ratings provided by one node for certain service is more trusted to the other one. In our scheme, BC similarity serves as a building block of the selection of trusted nodes.
D. SOCIAL COORDINATE
Social coordinate is relevant with similarity computation between nodes, which is indispensable to the selection of the trusted nodes in our paper.
In OSNs, nodes are connected with each other through social relationship (e.g. friend, relatives, colleagues or transaction for both sides, etc.). Each node has his own interests (equal to preferences or tastes) that reflect different ratings for the same item. Additionally, each node owns a special role related with their vocation in the real world such as teachers, white-collar workers or engineers. Therefore, common-interest and common-friends are another two metrics when selecting trusted nodes.
E. ATTACKS IN OSNS
In OSNs, there may exist some malicious nodes who may interfere with µ r 's decision via malicious ratings on services or items. We must design a resistance mechanism [44] - [46] to help µ r to avoid these malicious ratings. All the malicious ratings provided by malicious nodes are referred to as attacks. According to [14] , we classify attacks into several categories.
• Bad-mouthing attacks (BMA): a malicious node can damage the trust degree of a service provided by a well-behaved node by offering negative ratings. This is a form of collusion attack, i.e., a malicious node can collaborate with other malicious nodes to damage a good node's trust value.
• Ballot-stuffing attacks (BSA): a malicious node can boost the trust degree of a service provided by another malicious node by providing positive ratings. This is another form of collusion attacks, i.e., it can collaborate with other malicious nodes to increase a malicious node's trust value.
• White-washing attacks (WWA): a malicious node can remove or delete some negative ratings about him to be a trusted node, and then provides bad services or malicious ratings (Note that: In OSNs, people can delete or revoke their ratings about certain service or item but they can't modify their ratings which are public in the social platforms).
• On-off attacks (OOA): a malicious node provides malicious and normal ratings alternatively to a service provided by a well-behaved node. With OOA, a malicious node can avoid being detected and labeled as a malicious node.
IV. SCHEME DESIGN A. OVERVIEW
We first give a brief introduction to our proposed scheme.
As shown in Fig.3 , the main target of this paper aims to accurately evaluate the trust degree of a service provided by a high trust value node µ v for a target node µ r . In our scheme, there is a data center storing all of the nodes' information including social coordinate information, behavior contents (BC: services previously purchased by users ) list and their ratings to services recommended by µ v . These information can be regarded as input aspects in our scheme. Our work mainly contains three parts: have direct or indirect interactions with µ v . We observe that each node has his own social coordinate composed of social relationship, personal interest, and BC list. Hence, we compute the similarity between nodes from three aspects, i.e., common-friend, common-interest and common-BC. Finally, we combine these similarity on these three aspects by assigning different weight coefficients to derive a final similarity between µ r and other nodes. 2) Resistance Mechanism: In OSNs, some malicious nodes who have similarity with µ r in common-friend, common-interest or common-BC. The ratings provided by them may disturb µ r 's decision on S. Therefore, we must design a resistance mechanism to prevent a malicious node from disguising as a trusted node. • Direct trusted nodes: If a node µ i is a direct node of µ v and trusted for µ r , µ i is a direct trusted node for µ r .
• Indirect trusted nodes: if a node µ i is an indirect node of µ v and trusted for µ r , µ i is an indirect trusted node for µ r . We first compute direct and indirect trust value by combining the similarity with ratings, respectively. To be specific: (1) For µ r 's direct trusted nodes, we determine the weight coefficient of each node through similarity, and compute the direct trust value for µ r by a weighted sum incorporating ratings and weight coefficient. (2) For µ r 's indirect trusted nodes, we first find the direct trusted nodes of each indirect trusted node via similarity and resistance mechanism. Then we use the method applied in (1) to compute direct trust value for each µ r 's indirect trust nodes. Finally, we aggregate these direct trust value of µ r 's indirect trust nodes to get the indirect trust value for µ r . (3) We design an adaptive parameter mechanism which can autonomously adjust the parameter when determining the final trust combining direct with indirect trust value.
B. SIMILARITY BETWEEN NODES
In this section, we first compute the similarity between nodes to choose trusted nodes. In particular, here we consider three social metrics, i.e., common-friend, common-interest, common-BC. Let s (µ i , µ j ) denote the similarity of µ i and µ j in , where = {common-friend, common-interest, common-BC}. The computation of s (µ i , µ j ) is defined as follows.
1) COMMON-FRIEND (s cf )
The common-friend is the most important social relationship to screen recommendations among all the social metrics in our work. The rationale is that the quantity of common friends determines their closeness, i.e., the more common friends they have, the closer relationship they own. For two users µ x and µ y with their friend lists FL x and FL y , the computation of s cf between µ x and µ y is shown in equation (1) as follows:
From equation (1), we can know that if s cf between µ x and µ y is more larger, µ x will be selected as a trusted nodes for µ y with high possibility. If µ x and µ y are friends, we set s cf (µ x , µ y ) = 1.
2) COMMON-INTEREST (s ci )
The common interest is another crucial metric in our scheme. It represents the preference from different nodes to the same service. For example, if there exist two nodes who are fond of comedy, these two nodes have similar interest on comedy. For two nodes µ x and µ y with their personal interest lists I x and I y , the computation of s ci between µ x and µ y is expressed by equation (2)
The common-BC is the third metric in our scheme. It means that any two nodes in OSNs have experienced the similar service or adopted the same recommendation. The rationale of it reflects a fact that if µ x has common-behavior content with µ y , the opinion or rating from µ x is more reliable to µ y . For two nodes µ x and µ y with their content behavior lists BC x and BC y , then the computation of s BC between µ x and µ y is defined in equation (3):
4) WEIGHTED COMBINATION
After obtaining s cf , s ci , s BC , we compute the final similarity of µ x and µ y , denoted by s(µ x , µ y ) in a weighted sum. The equation of weighted combination is shown as equation (4),
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The target of similarity computation between nodes is to find out the trusted nodes for the target node µ r . But it is insufficient because there may exist malicious nodes who have similarity with µ r in OSNs. These nodes are classified into four categories according to their malicious behaviors mentioned in section III.C, i.e., bad-mouthing nodes executing BMA, ballot-stuffing nodes executing BSA, white-washing nodes executing WWA and on-off nodes executing OOA. These malicious nodes greatly impair the accuracy of trust computation and recommendation performance. Therefore, we design a resistance mechanism to withstand attacks from malicious nodes during the trusted nodes selection.
According to section III.C, these four malicious nodes hold their own behavior features which are different from general nodes, i.e., (1) BMA and BSA influence other nodes' trust value by providing malicious ratings. (2) WWA boost trust value for itself by removing bad ratings. (3) OOA behave maliciously or normally alternatively. Nevertheless, common nodes don't hold these three behavior features. Hence our resistance mechanism should consider the difference of behaviors between malicious nodes and common nodes.
The main idea of our resistance mechanism is comparison analysis. It contains two implications: 1) We compare the ratings from different nodes for the same service and analyze the relative error among these ratings simultaneously. If the relative error of rating provided by one node exceeds the threshold, this node is regarded as a malicious node, i.e., a distrusted node. 2) We compare the ratings provided by one node to other nodes for one service in a slot time t and analyze the relative error of these ratings. If the relative error of ratings provided by this node to other node is beyond the scope of threshold, this node is considered as a malicious node.
We suppose that a node µ i provides a service S, µ j is a node who experienced S recommended by µ i and gives a rating r ji . Moreover, µ j transmits r ji to other nodes, say µ k (k = 1,2,3,. . . ) who intends to experience S and inquire µ j . At this time, µ k has direct interaction with µ i and produce another rating r ki . In other words, µ k is an adjacent node of µ i and µ j . We assume that r ji received by each µ k is the same. Then we use following equation (5) to compute the relative error of r ji and r ki , = |r ji − r ki | r ki = ≤ ε, choose µ j a trusted node; > ε, not choose µ j .
where ε is a given threshold, which is approximate to 0, (k = 1,2,3,. . . ). When > ε, we give two results: 1) If r ji is positive and r ki is negative, µ j is a bad-mouthing attacker. 2) If r ji is negative and r ki is positive, µ j is a ballot-stuffing attacker. When ≤ ε, we also give two results: 1) If both r ji and r ki are negative and the relative error of them is less than ε, µ i provide a bad service, i.e., µ i is a white-washing attacker. 2) If both r ji and r ki are positive and the relative error of them is less than ε, µ i provides a good service.
We set t as a slot time indicating an interval between service S and next service provided by node µ i . If the rating r ji provided by µ j to each inquiry node µ k is quite different in t, µ j is a distrusted node. Besides that, we should also consider the rating r ji provided by µ j to inquiry nodes µ k (k = 1,2,3 ,. . . ) in adjacent consecutive slot times t. If the fluctuation of rating r ji provided by node µ j to inquiry node µ k (k = 1,2,3,. . . ) is manifest in either of these adjacent consecutive slot times t, µ j is an on-off attacker. We can use equation (5) to compute the relative error of any two ratings r ji received by inquiry nodes to reflect the fluctuation.
D. TRUST COMPUTATION
In this section, we compute the trust value of a service S recommended by a high trust value node, say µ v , according to the trusted nodes determined by section IV. We first compute the direct trust value and indirect trust value, respectively. Then we use the weighted sum to combine direct trust value with indirect trust value, where we design an efficient weight coefficient setting method which can adaptively adjust the weight.
1) DIRECT TRUST COMPUTATION
For direct trusted nodes, let µ DT r and R v be the set of direct trusted of µ r and µ i 's ratings on service S (µ i ∈ µ DT r ), where µ DT r = {µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ k }, R v = {r 1v , r 2v , . . . , r kv }. The set of the similarity between µ i (∀µ i ∈ µ DT r ) and µ r is denoted by S DT r , S DT r = {s(µ 1 , µ r ), s(µ 2 , µ r ), . . . , s(µ k , µ r )}. We get the direct trust value T DT v by equation (6) .
2) INDIRECT TRUST COMPUTATION
For indirect trusted nodes, let µ IDT r be a set of indirect trusted nodes, µ IDT r = {µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ l }. Actually, we can convert indirect trust computation into direct trust computation if we regard each µ j (∀µ j ∈ µ IDT r ) as another target node, denoted by µ rj .
Therefore, for µ rj (i.e., ∀µ j ∈ µ IDT r ), we first find his direct trusted nodes by section IV. Let µ rj DT be the set of µ rj 's direct trusted nodes (j=1,2,. . . l), µ rj DT = {µ j1 , µ j2 , . . . , µ jh }, S µ rj be the set of similarity between µ rj and µ ji (∀µ ji ∈ µ rj DT ), S µ rj = {s(µ j1 , µ rj ), s(µ j2 , µ rj ), . . . , s(µ jh , µ rj )}. We can use equation (7) to compute the direct trust value T DT vj of µ rj based on equation (6),
where r iv is the rating provided by µ rj 's direct trusted node to the service S provided by a high trust value node µ v , say µ ji (∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}).
After computing all of the direct trust value of µ rj , we aggregate all of these direct trust value to determine the final indirect trust value T IDT v for the target node µ r by equation (8) .
E. ADAPTIVE ADJUSTMENT OF WEIGHT
After computing the direct trust value and indirect trust value, we get the final trust value T v of service S provided by a high trust value node µ v by equation (9),
where λ is a weight coefficient (0 < λ < 1) to weigh the importance of direct trust value relative to the indirect the trust value. Generally, the trust of the service S provided by a high trust value node µ v should be approximate to the average satisfaction of users who have experienced S, i.e., direct trusted nodes. Therefore, we will formulate the selection of λ as an optimization problem as follows:
where MSE is short for mean square error reflecting the error of real value and calculated value, E S is the average satisfaction of direct trusted nodes i.e., the expected value of the service S. Before solving the above optimization problem, we first determine E S . How to get E S . According to the definition of E S , we know that E S is related with the ratings provided by direct trusted nodes. Let R v be a rating set including the rating r iv provided by each µ i (µ i ∈ µ DT r ) to the service S, i.e., R v = {r 1v , r 2v , . . . , r kv }. In general, ratings contain two types, positive and negative. So R v can be divided into two subsets: positive ratings set R P v and negative ratings set R N v . We use α and β to represent the cardinality of R P v and R N v , respectively, i.e., α = |R P v |, β = |R N v |. We will give our classification principle in the simulation.
We use Beta function [36] to compute the expected value of the service S because it has strong mathematical theory and popularity in trust management. In OSNs, a node µ i (µ i ∈ µ DT r ) produces a rating r iv (i = 1, 2, . . . k) after having experienced certain service S provided by a high trust value node µ v . r iv must either belong to R P v or R N v . Hence we use 1, 0 to indicate positive ratings and negative ratings respectively. In this way, we can regard r iv as an outcome of a Bernoulli trial with the probability of positive rating parameter θ following in a Beta distribution which is a conjugate prior Bernoulli distribution. For k direct trusted nodes, we can consider it as a binomial distribution for each node with the probability of positive rating parameter θ following in a Beta distribution which is a conjugate prior binomial distribution [36] .
To conclude, we can use equation (11) to compute the expected value E S ,
where θ satisfies a Beta distribution f (θ|α, β) as follows:
After obtaining E S , we next consider the optimization problem defined as equation (10) . We can regard MSE(λ) as a function of λ, and we know that the minimum of equation (10) is obtained at the point where the derivative is zero, i.e., MSE ( λ) = 0. Thus, we can get λ as follows,
the optimal value of λ should be in a range of [0,1] for the reason that it is a weight coefficient. Hence,
After determining λ, we substitute it into equation (10) to get the final trust value of service S provided by a high trust value node µ v .
V. SCHEME ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the complexity and performance of our scheme by experimental evaluation.
A. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The computational time of our proposed scheme mainly includes three parts, i.e., similarity computation between nodes, resistance mechanism and trust computation, where trust computation also contains three parts, they are direct/indirect trust computation and adaptive adjustment of weight. Given an undirected social network G = {U, ξ } which includes n nodes apart from a high trust value node µ v and a target node µ r , the time to compute similarity between nodes is O(n) if we consider the time of similarity computation shown in equation (1), (2), (3) as O (1) . The computational complexities of resistance mechanism is O(l + k), where l and k are the cardinality of the set of direct trusted nodes and indirect trusted nodes, respectively. The time to compute the direct trust value for the target node µ r is O(l), whereas the time of computation for indirect trust value is O(kh) because we execute the process of similarity between nodes and resistance mechanism for the target node µ r 's indirect trusted nodes again. The time to compute the adaptive adjustment of weight is O(1) because we only use equation (14) to get λ. To conclude, the overall computational complexity of our proposed scheme is O(n + k + 2l + kh).
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 1) DATA SETS AND STATISTICS
To validate the performance, we apply RHT in two real world data sets. Table 2 and Fig.5 show the statistics of the data set (Items in this section are identical to services mentioned above). Parameters about our scheme are shown in Table. 3. • Epinions: Tang et al. [37] crawled this data set from a famous online consumer review site Epinions (www.epinions.com). On this site, people not only write critical reviews for various items but also scan and rate the reviews written by others. In addition, people can also add other members to their trust networks if they feel that their reviews are helpful for decision on items.
• Ciao: Tang et al. [37] also provided the second data set from Ciao, another well-known review site which resembles Epinions. In order to reduce the computation cost, we filter out some items that are rated less than five times for both two data sets. Finally, we get 20382 users with 30989 items in Epinions data set, and 5868 users with 10724 items.
2) EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
After filtering out the data sets, we split the data sets according to a given proportion η. For example, we randomly pick out 5 users from 100 users and regard them as malicious users according to their average ratings, where η is 5%. More details about malicious nodes simulation will be elaborated in section V.C.
Assuming that we have obtained two data sets via splitting, one contains malicious users (denoted by Data M ), the other contains common users (denoted by Data C ). For users in Data M , we adopt 5-fold cross validation to evaluate the performance of RHT. In each run, 80% of the items for each user are split in training set and the remaining 20% of the items for each user belongs to test set.
In our experiments, we use the root mean square error (RMSE) to measure the prediction error for all methods. Besides, we adopt information retrieval metrics, i.e., Precision@K, Recall@K and FScore to measure the quality of recommendation list. All of these metrics are defined as follows:
where N is the total number of items that can be calculated, and r µ,i and r µ,i denote real ratings and calculated ratings (i.e., trust value T v ) respectively. A lower RMSE means a higher calculation accuracy.
where Rec i (k) is a recommendation list in descending order for the ith user, which contains the first k items. Here we default k as 5, 10, 15, 20, 25.
3) COMPARED SCHEME
To demonstrate the effectiveness, we compare the proposed scheme with the following state-of-the-art approaches. Our experiments are developed by anaconda, and the execution environment is Intel Core7 with 12G RAM, Windows 10, and anaconda 5.2.0.
• PMF [38] : This method was proposed by Salakhutdinov and Minh [38] , which is based on matrix factorization.
• SoRec [39] : This method is a social trust-aware recommendation method that factorizes the rating matrix and users social links by sharing the same user latent space.
• RSTE [40] : This method is a linear combination of the basic matrix factorization approach and a social-network based approach.
• SocialMF [41] : This method incorporates the mechanism of trust propagation into the recommendation model.
• SREE [42] : This method integrates distance into CF and utilize social connection. In addition, it uses Euclidean distance to measure the gap.
• TidalTrust [43] : This method was proposed by Massa et al. [43] , which produces predictive ratings based on a trust inference algorithm. We adopt the same parameter settings as description in these compared methods when conducting experiments.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the experimental results. Three types of experiments are conducted: 1) Resistance mechanism analysis. 2) Comparison on recommendation performance. 3) Effect of parameters in RHT.
1) RESISTANCE MECHANISM ANALYSIS
In this section, we first describe how to inject malicious nodes. For a given proportion η and a data set containing N users, there are four different attacks (BMA, BSA, WWA OOA).
• BMA injection: We randomly select N × η users from the data set, and set the 80% of ratings as lower values e.g. 1, 2.
• BSA injection: We randomly select N × η users from the data set, and set the 80% of ratings as higher values e.g., 4, 5.
• WWA injection: We randomly select N × η users from the data set, and set all of their ratings as higher values, e.g., 4, 5.
• OOA injection: We randomly select N × η users from the data set, and set the 20% their ratings as lower value, e.g., 1, 2. The rationale of injection can be concluded by the features of attacks: 1) BMA often provide false negative ratings, while BSA often provide false positive ratings. Hence we set higher proportion of their ratings are negative or positive and we set this proportion η as 80%. 2) WWA always delete bad ratings. So we set all of their ratings as higher value, e.g., 4, 5. 3) OOA provide malicious ratings and normal ratings alternatively, i.e., their ratings contain normal ratings and malicious ratings. Moreover, normal ratings are more than malicious ratings [14] . Therefore we set 20% ratings as malicious ratings (other proportions such as 25%, 30% are also satisfied). As shown in Fig.6 , our resistance mechanism can withstand four attacks efficiently, i.e., Bad-Mouthing Attacks (BMA), Ballot-Stuffing Attacks (BSA), White-Washing Attacks (WWA) and On-Off Attacks (OOA). Fig6 (a) and (b) indicate the result of our resistance mechanism to BMA and BSA, both of the malicious nodes proportion η for BMA and BSA ranges from 5% to 40% with an increase of 5% each time. In Fig.6 (a) , when the malicious node proportion is set as 5%, the trust value of services in Epinions and Ciao data sets are the lowest because the proportion of BMA nodes are larger than 5% actually in data sets. As the BMA nodes proportion becomes larger, the trust value increase. When the BMA nodes proportion attains 20%, the trust value become a fixed value (i.e., 4.10 and 3.32 in Epinions and Ciao data sets respectively), and when the BMA nodes proportion continues to become larger, the trust value keeps constant. In Fig.6 (b) , the trust value attains the largest when the BSA nodes proportion is the smallest, i.e., 5%. But as the BSA nodes proportion increases, the trust value in two data sets becomes smaller initially, and then constant after BSA nodes proportion exceeds 20%. In other words, the trust value doesn't change with an increase in malicious nodes proportion (BMA and BSA) after malicious nodes proportion goes beyond 20% from Fig.6 (a) and (b) . Therefore, we conclude that the proposed resistance mechanism can resist the BMA and BSA efficiently.
In Fig.6 (c), we set η in an interval [3%, 30%] for WWA. The trust value of two data sets initially decreases until η attains 6.5%, and then slightly increase. When η increases from 8% to 15%, the trust value of two data sets becomes fairly fluctuated. When η excels 15%, the trust value becomes smooth, i.e., the trust value doesn't depend on the increase of the malicious nodes proportion. We conclude that RHT resists WWA efficiently. Fig.6 (d) reflect the result of the proposed resistance mechanism to OOA. In Fig.6 (d) , η is set from 5% to 30%, the trust value of Epinions and Ciao data sets fluctuate slightly when the malicious nodes proportion varies between 5% and 18%. After the malicious nodes proportion continue to become larger (more then 18%), the trust value of these two data sets remains constant. In other words, the trust value of these two data sets is not influenced by the increase of malicious nodes proportion. Hence, the proposed resistance mechanism can resist OOA effectively.
Finally, we can conclude that the proposed resistance mechanism do withstand four attacks efficiently.
2) COMPARISON ON RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE
In this section, we mainly discuss the recommendation performance of RHT compared with other schemes. To be fair, all of the schemes are applied in data sets with 30% malicious nodes injection. Tables. 4 and 5 show the comparison results on Epinions and Ciao data sets which include malicious nodes from the perspective of precision, recall, FScore (we set k as 5, 10) and RMSE, respectively. The results indicate that our scheme outperforms other six schemes with malicious nodes account. In terms of precision, RHT attains higher value with 30% increase compared with PMF and SoRec on average. In comparison with RSTE and SocialMF, the increase in precision@5 and precision@10 is more than 10% and 20%, separately. Compared with the latest scheme SREE, RHT also has slightly increase in precision (e.g., when k equals to 5, RHT achieves 0.0744, 0.0613, 0.0555, 0.0647 with 3.47%, 3.55%, 3.54%, 4.35% increase on Epinions data set with four attacks, respectively.). As for recall (k = 5), the highest values attained by SREE on Epinions and Ciao data sets are 0.0581 and 0.0655, respectively. However, our scheme gets a higher value than it with 4.3% and 7.48% increase, respectively. Because of the higher value in precision and recall, RHT has significant improvement in FScore when k is 5 and 10. Higher precision, recall and FScore values indicate that RHT can efficiently rank the services the target user preferred in top position. Figs.7, 8 and 9 show the total results where k varies from 5 to 25 on precision, recall and FScore. Besides, our scheme also beats other six schemes in RMSE which is used to measure the accuracy of rating prediction. Compared with PMF, SoRec, RSTE, SocialMF, SREE and TidalTrust, on average, RHT lowers the RMSE by 10.45%, 10.36% 9.34%, 9.50%, 7.02% and 10.90% on Epinions with attacks, by 8.23%, 8.08%, 6.96%, 7.37%, 5.96% and 8.46% on Ciao data set with attacks, respectively. Lower RMSE value represents that RHT can efficiently predict ratings compared with other schemes when malicious nodes are injected.
Besides, the results also shows the following two points: 1) Schemes simply based on matrix factorization (i.e., PMF) or trust (i.e., TidalTrust) can't accomplish accurate recommendation when malicious nodes (BMA, BSA, WWA and OOA) exist. 2) SoRec, RSTE, SocialMF and SREE, which combine trust relationship with matrix factorization can partially resistant attacks because Tables 4 and 5 indicate that recommendation performance has been finitely improved in terms of precision, recall, FScore and RMSE compared with PMF and TidalTrut. Our scheme attains better recommendation performance compared with those schemes.
To conclude, current schemes mentioned above are susceptible to attacks (i.e., BMA, BSA, WWA and OOA) because these schemes assume that all the ratings are trustworthy. However, this idealized assumption doesn't match reality. In practice, there do exist malicious ratings in RSs and these ratings may impair the performance of recommendation. Current schemes don't consider this scenario while we do. Hence, our scheme RHT not only achieves better recommendation performance but also withstands attacks in comparison with other current schemes.
3) EFFECT OF PARAMETERS
In this section, we primarily discuss the effect of parameters recorded in Table. 3 on the performance of RHT. Here we use control variable method to accomplish the experiments on parameters. Control variable method is a scientific research method which keeps one variable (or parameter) changeable while other variables or parameters hold unchangeable during experiments. For example, when we study the effect induced by ω cf , we fix the value of ω ci , ω BC and ε. On considering the efficiency and computational ability of devices, we randomly select a subset containing 3000 users from Epinions and Ciao data sets, respectively. Then we inject malicious nodes with η = 30% according to section V.C. We initially fix ω cf , ω ci and ω BC as 0.2, respectively. Then we change the remaining two parameters and observe the effect brought by them. Here we set k as 10.
As shown in Fig.10 , we can conclude several points: 1) For precision@10 and recall@10, Both Epinions with BMA attack and Ciao with OOA attack attain the highest value at ω cf = 0.2, ω ci = 0.3, ω BC = 0.5, that is 0.0654 and 0.0837. The corresponding recall@10 is 0.1042 and 0.1133, respectively. 2) For RMSE, the effect produced by parameters is inconspicuous compared with other three metrics because no obvious variation occur to the slope of lines. 3) Actually, the variation of parameters has slightly effect on the recommendation performance because the mean average error we derived is less than 1% in total, which validate the robust of RHT.
VI. CONCLUSION
The idea of RHT is initially inspired by the fact that people are more willing to select the services recommended by a high trust value user or SP. But actually, some services provided by a high trust value entity can't satisfy target node's requirements very often. Sometimes some false or fake services provided by a high trust value entity may lead to great loss of property even lives once the target node experiences these services. Current works seldom take this problem into consideration. Therefore, we propose RHT to accurately evaluate the trust degree of services provided by a high trust value entity. RHT contains two parts: One is trust nodes selection, the other is trust computation, where the former part includes similarity computation between nodes and resistance mechanism. When a high trust value entity provide a service, there exist other nodes who experience this service afford ratings or opinions. These information is crucial to a target node's selection on this service. We first compute the similarity between target node and those nodes who rate service to choose trusted nodes. During this process, we must consider the existence of malicious nodes and design a resistance mechanism to prevent malicious nodes from being chosen as trusted nodes. Second, we design a trust computation method to calculate the trust degree of service provided by a high trust value node. The experiment results show that the proposed scheme do withstand five common attacks. Additionally, the proposed scheme has higher accuracy on trust computation compared with current classical works.
As future work, we plan to dig out other security problem such as privacy preserving during the process of recommendation and try to combine trust with privacy in the IoT. 
